🎰 Harrah's Metropolis Casino and Hotel in Southern Illinois

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Case opinion for US 7th Circuit SOUTHERN ILLINOIS RIVERBOAT CASINO CRUISES INC v. TRIANGLE INSULATION AND SHEET METAL COMPANY.


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Case opinion for US 7th Circuit SOUTHERN ILLINOIS RIVERBOAT CASINO CRUISES INC v. TRIANGLE INSULATION AND SHEET METAL COMPANY.


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EX 62 dexhtm ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION OF SOUTHERN ILLINOIS RIVERBOAT/CASINO CRUISES, INC.


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Read the full text of VIGUS v. SOUTHERN ILLINOIS RIVERBOAT/CASINO CRUISES for free on Casetext.


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City of Fort Wayne , F. Today, "temporal sequence analysis is not a magical formula which results in a finding of a discriminatory cause. While the point is very close, Smith has presented sufficient evidence that, when combined with the temporal proximity between the protected activity and the adverse action, supports an inference that Harrah's terminated her employment for an illegal reason. It also prohibits employers from discharging or otherwise discriminating against anyone for opposing practices that are unlawful under the FMLA, 29 U. In her roughly twelve years as a blackjack dealer for Harrah's, Smith requested and received at least thirteen FMLA qualifying leaves of absences — Harrah's did not deny any of her requests. If an employee earned twelve points during any twelve-month period, Harrah's could terminate her. As is true in almost all these cases, there is more to the story. Buie , F. Because these lies were violations warranting termination under Harrah's policies, Thomas and Jeffords fired her on the spot. Express Corp. Notably, Smith's cases are old. Kelley Keeling, a Casino Manager, sent the following reply:. If this is the case, her focus on the "causal link" between her protected conduct and her termination is misplaced. Jeffords did not date her notes, so she was not sure when she spoke to Smith. On March 28, , Smith received a "documented coaching" because she had accumulated seven points. Its employees received points for absences for which they did not receive permission in advance, but not when they took leave with permission or pursuant to the FMLA. Kauffman v. In any event, in Jeffords's mind, Smith's description of her limitations did not jibe with the reports and videotapes from the investigator. This supports her theory of causation then, because it suggests that Harrah's "concocted the story" to cover its tracks. There is no question that she engaged in protected activity and no question that she suffered an adverse employment action, so the only issue is causation. Preferred Technical Group , F. This exhausted all her available leave. The Seventh Circuit did away with the causal link requirement for purposes of the indirect method in Stone v. To establish this causal link, Smith can offer direct evidence — essentially an admission by Harrah's that its actions were motivated by prohibited animus — or circumstantial evidence from which a jury could infer intentional discrimination. The investigator reported Smith's activities and videotaped her while she was on leave. The FMLA provides leave for qualified employees who must be absent from work for family or medical reasons. Now, the Court states its reasons. In determining the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact, the Court construes all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. TRC Holdings, Inc. This and other information caused Jeffords to become suspicious of Smith's July leave, which led her to hire an investigator to surveil Smith. City of Indianapolis Pub. If the moving party meets its burden, the nonmoving party has the burden "to go beyond the pleadings and affirmatively demonstrate, by specific factual allegations, that there is a genuine issue of material fact which requires trial. McClendon relied on Dey , but went further, suggesting that a two-to three-day period between the protected activity and the adverse action is sufficient to establish causation as a matter of law. At her deposition, Jeffords testified that Smith told her she could not stand or bend, that she was "confined pretty much to her home," that she "didn't hardly get out at all," that she was "basically [on] bed rest," that she "just went to the doctor's," and that she "was sick and throwing up blood all the time. Advised to rest, off work until released. See Anderson v. City of Fort Wayne , 91 F. Giving Smith the benefit of the doubt, the Court will address her claims under the direct method. Rather, "other circumstances must also be present which reasonably suggest that the two events are somehow related to one another. Sec'y of State , F. She received a written warning on May 3, , because she had accumulated eight points and she got a "Final Written Warning" on July 12, , because she had accrued ten points. Smith's doctor also testified that he did not restrict Smith to bed rest or tell her to remain in her home. Pena , 89 F. In Dey , the Court remarked, "Generally, a plaintiff may establish [a causal] link through evidence that the discharge took place on the heels of protected activity. Hayes Wheels Int'l-Ind. Smith denied this account, but admitted she told them she took a five-day vacation in Florida at the end of July At the end of the meeting, Jeffords and Thomas concluded that Smith had lied about her medical status. Relying on Dey v. On that day, Smith entered into an "Attendance Intervention Agreement with Harrah's which provided" her a last chance to shape up. The Court found causation largely on temporal succession, but noted that the defendant's proffered reason for the termination was poor performance, despite the fact that the plaintiff had no record of poor performance evaluations and had received a large raise shortly before she was fired. Liberty Lobby, Inc. Phillip Morris Inc. She shared her conclusions with Thompson and Thomas, and told Thompson to schedule the meeting on August 15, Thomas and Jeffords met with Smith on August According to Thomas, Smith told he and Jeffords that her doctor had ordered bed rest and told her she could not bend, lift, stand or travel. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Smith, and drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, the evidence establishes the following facts. In addition to suspicious timing, Smith suggests that Harrah's reason for terminating her supports an inference of causation.

At the southern illinois riverboat casino cruises pretrial conference, the Court orally denied Harrah's motion for summary judgment Doc. More recently, the Seventh Circuit has said, "mere temporal proximity between the filing of the charge of discrimination and the action alleged to have been taken in retaliation for that filing will rarely be sufficient in and of itself to create a triable issue.

As explained by the Court in Stone" McDonnell Douglas is designed to give the plaintiff a boost when he has no actual evidence of discrimination or click here but just some southern illinois riverboat casino cruises circumstances.

In her view, because her doctor did not specifically restrict certain activities — e. Sugars, Inc. See BuieF. AllisonF. Colt Constr. PughF.

Green , U. This is especially so given that Harrah's provides no details whatsoever regarding the activities its investigator observed Smith undertaking. Advised to rest and remain off work until released. In , Harrah's had a point-based attendance policy. That she went on vacation does not, in itself, suggest that her limitations were such that she could work. Just a little FYI. To succeed under the direct method, Smith must show that she engaged in protected activity and that she suffered an adverse employment action because she did so. Zenith Radio Corp. Rather, a genuine issue of material fact exists only if "a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the [nonmoving party] on the evidence presented. Though her doctor advised her to rest and avoid stressful situations, he did not prescribe any specific limitations on her activity. The issue in this case is whether Harrah's fired Smith because she took FMLA leave or for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. Jennifer had requested PTO for that time frame. Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. City of Attica, Ind. According to Jeffords, she spoke with Smith — and took notes of the conversation — on the telephone sometime while she was on leave. A genuine issue of material fact is not demonstrated by the mere existence of "some alleged factual dispute between the parties," Anderson, U. It appears that Smith seeks to proceed under the indirect method. The Court must accept that Smith never made a phone call to Jeffords and did not speak of specific limitations during the meeting on August In this light, the notion that Harrah's fired her for "fraudulent medical leave" is not supported by the record. Smith reported ready for work on August 12, , and was told to report on August 15, During a meeting shortly before her shift was about to start on August 15, Diana Jeffords, Employee Relations Manager, and Aubrey Thomas, Vice President of Operations, told her she was fired for "fraudulent medical leave. To show that Harrah's discriminated against her, Smith can proceed under the direct method or the indirect method — the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. I am sure that we can't do anything about this but just wanted to point out the fact that its obvious she is finding a way to work the system. If he can prove that his protected expression caused him to be fired, he doesn't need McDonnell Douglas and it gives him nothing. When viewed as a whole, the suspicious circumstances surrounding Smith's termination support an inference that her taking of FMLA leave was a "substantial factor" or a "motivating factor" in her discharge. Office of Ill. King v. In her deposition, Smith testified that she did not say these things to Jeffords. Smith was ill on July 12 and she asked for and received paid leave so she could see her doctor the next day. Catrett , U. Because of the discrepancy, Jeffords concluded that Smith had lied to her and was capable of performing her job. Courts construe these provisions as prohibiting an employer's retaliation against an employee for exercising her FMLA rights.